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Executive Summary
Variable annuities have been one of the most rapidly growing financial
products of the last two decades. Between 1996 and 2004, nominal
sales of variable annuities in the United States more than doubled,
from $51 billion to $130 billion. Variable annuities now account for
almost two-thirds of annuity sales. The investment returns associated
with variable annuities resemble those from mutual funds, and vari-
able annuity buyers can select among a range of asset allocation
options. Variable annuities are considered insurance products under
the tax law, so buyers are not taxed on their investment returns until
they make withdrawals from their variable annuity accounts. This
paper describes the tax treatment of variable annuities, presents sum-
mary information on their ownership patterns, and explores the impor-
tance of several distinct motives for household purchase of variable
annuities. The discussion of tax treatment examines the impact of the
2001 and 2003 tax bills on the relative tax treatment of variable annu-
ities and other financial products. Household data from the 1998 and
2001 Survey of Consumer Finances show that variable annuity owner-
ship is highly concentrated among high-income and high net wealth
sub-groups of the population. Variable annuity ownership is less con-
centrated, however, than ownership of several other types of financial
assets. Evidence on the role of tax incentives in encouraging ownership
of variable annuities is mixed. The probability of owning a variable an-
nuity rises with the marginal tax rate throughout most of the income
distribution, but it is lower for households in the top tax bracket than
for those with slightly lower tax rates.164 Brown and Poterba
1.Introduction
The shift from defined benefit pension plans to self-directed defined
contribution plans, the possibifity of reforming Social Security so that
it includes personal accounts, and the growth in individual retirement
accounts (IRAs) are examples of a broad shift toward greater self-
reliance in the provision of retirement income in the United States.
In policy and academic discussions of individual retirement security
in this new environment, two issues are particularly prominent. One is
the role of equity markets in providing for future retirement income.
There has been a steady rise in the extent of equity market partici-
pation over the past two decades, largely as a result of the growth
of mutual funds and the expansion of IRAs and 401(k) plans. The sec-
ond issue is the decline in life annuitization in retirement, arising pri-
marily from the shift away from automatically annuitized defined
benefit (DB) plans and towards defined contribution (DC) plans. Many
defined contribution plans do not offer life annuities as a payout option.
Despite the significance of both equity ownership and annuitization,
very little research has focused on the rapid growth during the last
two decades of a class of products known as variable annuities, which
in principle combine equity ownership and an option to annuitize.
Variable annuities were introduced in the mid-1950s to compete with
mutual funds. The College Retirement Equity Fund (CREF) offered
the first variable annuity product. The market for variable annuities
remained quite small for several subsequent decades. In the early
1990s, however, the market began to grow rapidly. The American
Council of Life Insurers (1999) reports that between 1990 and 1999,
gross sales of individual (non-group) variable annuities rosefrom $3.5
billion to $63 billion. More recent data from the National Association
for Variable Annuities (2005) suggest that variable annuity sales have
declined since the late 1990s. The National Association for Variable
Annuities (NAVA) data show 1999 sales of variable annuities outside
pension accounts, almost exclusively individual annuities, of $60 bil-
lion, with a decline to $51.3 billion in 2004. Total variable annuity sales
in 2004, combining qualified account and non-qualified account sales,
totaled $129.7 billion. Sales to qualified accounts were slightly less than
40 percent of the market. Sales of fixed annuities, the annuity products
that are most often the subject of economic analysis, totaled $89 billion
in 2004. Total assets invested in variable annuity products amounted toHousehold Ownership of Variable Annuities 165
$1.12 trillion at the end of 2004, compared with $532 billion in fixed
annuities.
Individuals may demand variable annuities for at least three, not
necessarily exclusive reasons. The first is a desire to accumulate wealth
at favorable after-tax rates of return. Interest, dividends, and capital
gains that accrue on assets held in variable annuity accounts are not
taxed until the policyholder receives variable annuity payouts. This
provides policyholders with the tax benefits of "inside buildup," just
as in IRAs and 401(k) plans. Gentry and Milano (1998) use both cross-
state variation in income tax rates and time series variation in federal
rates between 1984 and 1993 to study how taxes affect variable annuity
demand. They find that aggregate sales of variable annuities are posi-
tively correlated with state marginal income tax rates, suggesting that
variable annuities are purchased in part to avoid the tax burden on
investments in traditional taxable accounts. At the time of their study,
there was no publicly available household survey data on variable an-
nuity ownership.
A second potential attraction of variable annuities is their insurance
component. Variable annuity contracts offer various forms of insur-
ance. A common provision specifies that if the policyholder dies before
retirement, heirs receive at least the nominal value of the policy contri-
butions. Milevsky and Posner (2001) use risk-neutral option pricing to
value the guaranteed minimum death benefit in variable annuities,
and they conclude that in most cases the value of this insurance is quite
small. However, many variable annuity contracts offer additional
insurance features. We are not aware of any study that examines
whether investor characteristics, such as self-reported risk aversion,
can explain variable annuity demand.
The third motivation for holding variable annuities is the option
to convert the contract at some future date to a life annuity that pro-
vides an annuitized income stream, with the payouts indexed to the
performance of a diversified investment portfolio. Brown, Mitchell,
and Poterba (2001) explore this aspect of annuity demand in a stylized
life-cycle model. They conclude that most consumers would find it
welfare-enhancing to hold at least a portion of their retirement portfo-
lio in an equity-linked annuity product, but they do not examine actual
patterns of annuity demand. Historically, very few variable annuity
products have been converted into life annuities that pay benefits dur-
ing retirement.166 Brown and Poterba
The limited body of research on household demand for variable
annuities is explained largely by the lack of data. The 1998 Survey of
Consumer Finances was the first nationally representative household
survey to ask detailed questions about the ownership of variable annu-
ity products. We use both this survey and the following wave, the 2001
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), to study the ownership of vari-
able annuity products.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first describes how vari-
able annuities work, focusing particularly on the tax incentives, the in-
surance features, and the payout options at retirement. It also provides
data on the size of the U.S. variable annuity market. Section 2 explains
how the 1998 and 2001 SCF data can be used to analyze the cross-
sectional determinants of variable annuity ownership. It presents sum-
mary statistics on variable annuity ownership in the SCF surveys.The
third section compares variable annuity ownership patterns to those
of other financial assets and also reports on the inter-relationships
between ownership of variable annuities and these other assets. The
fourth section concludes by sketching several research issues about the
demand for variable annuities that our analysis raises but cannot re-
solve due to data limitations.
2.The U.S. Variable Annuity Market
Variable annuities combine features of insurance products and mutual
fund-style investment accounts. The funds invested in a variable annu-
ity are held in designated subaccounts that are kept separate from the
insurance company's other assets. As a result, and unlike most life in-
surance or fixed annuity products, the assets are not subject toclaims
by the insurance company's creditors should the insurance company
become insolvent. Income earned on the annuity investments is tax-
deferred until the individual begins making withdrawals. The prefer-
ential tax treatment of variable annuities derives from the inclusion of
life insurance elements in the contract. Because individuals who hold
whole life insurance policies are not taxed on their accruing income,
excluding income on annuity policies from taxation preserves compa-
rable treatment of these two asset categories.
Variable annuity sales in the United States exploded during the
1990s, and they have remained stable at a high level for the last half de-
cade. Data from the American Council of Life Insurers (1999) suggest
that individual (non-group) variable annuity considerations grew at aHousehold Ownership of Variable Annuities 167
nominal annual rate of 38 percent between 1990 and 1999. One limita-
tion of most data on sales of variable annuities is that the statistics refer
to sales of new variable annuity policies rather than the net purchases
of variable annuities. Net purchases are smaller than sales of new poli-
cies because of surrenders, withdrawals, and benefit payments from
existing policies, and because of "section 1035 exchanges." This name
refers to a provision in the tax code that allows a policyholder to make
a direct transfer of accumulated funds in one annuity policy into an-
other annuity policy without creating a taxable event. Within qualified
plans, both mutual funds and variable annuities can be exchanged be-
tween vendors without triggering a tax liability. If an individual sells
stocks in a taxable account in order to purchase shares of a different
company, this exchange would trigger capital gains taxation. With
annuities, however, there is no tax consequence. An individual can ex-
change one company's product for another's and the earnings from the
original investment wifi remain tax deferred until the annuity owner
withdraws money from the variable annuity contract.
There is a substantial divergence between gross and net sales of vari-
able annuity policies. Data for 2004 from NAVA (2005) suggest gross
sales of $129.7 biffion, and net sales of $40.2 billion. Ceruffi Associates,
Inc. (2001) reports that net purchases represented more than half of
total variable annuity sales between 1995 and 1997; they declined to
only 20 percent of total sales in 2001. Because 1035 exchanges repre-
sent a substantial part of the divergence between gross and net sales,
to some extent insurance companies are competing for existing, rather
than new, variable annuity business.
2.1The Structure of Variable Annuity Products
Variable annuities can be purchased in retirement accounts and out-
side these accounts. Qualified annuities are purchased using assets from
qualified retirement plans, such as 401(k) plans. In many cases, such as
university employees purchasing annuities through TIAA-CREF, qual-
ified annuities may be purchased through an employer. Our analysis
focuses on annuities purchased outside retirement plans; these are
non-qualified annuities.
Most variable annuity providers offer a broad range of sub-accounts
in which the assets may be invested. Equity and bond portfolios are
the most common options. A buyer may purchase the variable annuity
with a single initial premium payment or with a sequence of pre-
mium payments over time. Most insurance companies selling variable168 Brown and Poterba
Table 5.1
Expenses and Insurance Costs, Variable Annuities and Mutual Funds, Weighted by
Assets Under Management, 2002
Variable Annuities
Source: Authors' tabulations from 2002 Morningstar Variable Annuities and Mutual
Funds databases. Costs and expenses are measured in hundreds of basis points per year.
annuities collect two fees: an investment management fee and an insur-
ance charge. The insurance charge covers insurancebenefits associated
with the variable annuity. Many variable annuities have front-end re-
tail loads, and there are often surrender penalties that apply if funds
are withdrawn before a pre-specified time period, often seven years.
These penalties, known as contingent deferred surrender charges, can
be several percentage points of the annuity's value. Historically, with
the notable exceptions of TIAA-CREF and Vanguard, there were very
few no-load variable annuities. Cerulli Associates, Inc. (2001) reports,
however, that the no-load segment of this market has expanded in re-
cent years. There has also been a shift toward unbundled variable
annuities that offer buyers a minimal level of insurance, perhaps only
a death benefit, along with the option to purchaseadditional insurance
on an a la carte basis.
The combination of investment management expenses and insurance
charges substantially reduces the returns available to variable annuity
investors. Tn 2002, Morningstar reported that the average total expense
for variable annuities investing in diversified portfolios of domestic
equities with a growth and income focus was 115 basis points, while
that for variable annuities investing in government bonds was 191
basis points. These expenses are substantially larger than those on
open-end mutual funds holding similar assets.
Investment ManagementInsurance Total Mutual
Objective Expense Charge Expenses Funds
All 0.57 1.09 1.65 0.92
Balanced 0.61 1.20 1.80 0.79
Corporate bond 0.55 1.13 1.68 0.72
Government bond 0.61 1.30 1.91 0.90
Growth 0.70 1.23 1.93 1.04
Growth and income 0.34 0.81 1.15 0.66
High yield bond 0.70 1.29 1.99 1.09
International bond 1.01 1.33 2.34 1.05
International stock 0.84 1.17 2.01 1.11Household Ownership of Variable Annuities 169
Table 5.1 presents information on the average expenses and insur-
ance costs for variable annuities by various categories. The data for this
table are drawn from Morningstar databases for both variable annu-
ities and mutual funds. The table shows that the asset-weighted aver-
age management expense for variable annuities in 2002 was 57 basis
points, compared with 92 basis points for all mutual funds. The aver-
age variable annuity insurance charge was 109 basis points, however,
making total expenses 165 basis points. Only 5 percent of variable an-
nuity contracts have insurance expenses under 75 basis points, where-
as 12 percent charge more than 140 basis points. The entries in table
5.1 are asset-weighted so they are somewhat different than other tabu-
lations, such as those in National Association for Variable Annuities
(2005), that weight all variable annuities equally.
Table 5.1 shows that the management expenses vary by the variable
annuity's investment objective, with the highest charges on interna-
tional bond and international stock funds. For mutual funds, the funds
with these investment objectives also have two of the three highest
average expense ratios. There is some variation across investment
objectives in the variable annuities' insurance charge. The cost of the
insurance should depend on the investment portfolio, since the value
of an option to repay the annuity principal or the highest value of the
annuity assets on any policy anniversary depends on portfolio param-
eters such as the volatility of the underlying assets. The high insurance
charge of 130 basis points per year for variable annuities invested in
government bonds is puzzling, given that government bonds are a
low-risk investment. However, variable annuity contracts are complex
and they vary in the precise nature of their insurance component. It is
possible that the insurance contracts typically associated with variable
annuities that invest in government bonds are more generous than
those associated with other asset allocations.
The management costs associated with investments in mutual funds
or variable annuities can have an important effect on long-run wealth
accumulation. To illustrate this, assume that an individual contributes
$1,000 to a qualified account at age 30 and allows the account to grow
for 30 years at an average annual nominal return of 10 percent before
administrative costs. At age 60, the value of the account wifi have
grown to $13,563 if the expense charge is 92 basis points per year, but
to $11,400 if the charge is 165 basis points. Thus, an increase in the ex-
pense ratio equal to the difference between the average expense ratio
for mutual funds and that for variable annuities reduces wealth at age170 Brown and Poterba
60 by roughly 16 percent. This calculation assumes that the insurance
component of the variable annuity does not affect the purchaser's
wealth at age 60; there are some scenarios in which the insurance
would affect the terminal value of the annuity contract.
2.2The Tax Treatment of Variable Annuities: Accumulation and
Payout Phases
The opportunity for assets held in variable annuities to grow at the
pre-tax rate of return offers investors the potential to generate higher
after-tax wealth from variable annuity investments than from tradi-
tional taxable investments. The complex tax treatment of withdrawals
from variable annuities, however, makes the after-tax return advan-
tage sensitive to the annuity buyer's payout decisions. If the payout
takes place before the annuitant is 59, unless thedistribution takes
the form of a life annuity, the distribution is subject to income tax on
the difference between the payout and the premium, plus a 10 percent
penalty tax. Thus, if an individual owned a single-premium variable
annuity that was purchased at age 35 for $10,000, and he or she de-
cided to withdraw the total value of the account at age 55, the tax on
the proceeds would equal the individual's marginal federal income
tax, plus 10 percent, times the difference between the account value
and $10,000.
There is no reliable, publicly available data on withdrawals from
variable annuities. Limited evidence suggests, however, that funds
accumulated in variable annuity accounts are rarely converted to life
contingent annuities at retirement. Brown and Warshawsky (2004) re-
port that only about 1 percent of the individuals covered by variable
annuity products are receiving payments from these accountsthe
rest are still in the accumulation phase. Of course, these statistics do
not imply that annuities currently in the accumulation phase will never
be annuitized, but they underscore the importance of tracking the be-
havior of variable annuity owners over time.
There are several different ways to receive distributions from a vari-
able annuity, and they are subject to different tax rules. First, the poli-
cyholder could choose a lump-sum distribution. In this case, the tax
due at the time of the distribution is r* (V - P), where r denotes the
policyholder's ordinary income tax rate, V denotes the value of the
variable annuity at the time of the distribution, and P denotes the an-
nuity premium. The premium, P. functions just like the purchase price
for an asset that is subject to capital gains tax. Note that in this case,
there is no annuitization associated with the variable annuity. If theHousehold Ownership of Variable Annuities 171
policyholder chooses to take several distributions from the policy, the
distributions are fully taxable as ordinary income mffl the policy's
remaining value falls below P. The early payouts from the policy are
assumed to be income, while the later payouts are returns of principal.
Second, the policyholder could choose to make periodic withdrawals
from the variable annuity account. Such withdrawals are taxed accord-
ing to an earnings first, principal last rule. If the value of the variable
annuity account exceeds the annuity's purchase price at the time of the
withdrawal, the withdrawal is fully taxable as ordinary income until
the withdrawal reduces the value of the variable annuity contract
to less than the purchase price. Withdrawals from an annuity with a
value below the purchase price are treated as returns of principal and
are not included in taxable income.
A third payout structure the policyholder might choose is a stream
of variable payouts for a pre-specified length of time, such as 10 years.
In this case, the insurance company finds the value A0 that satisfies the
equation:
v=
where V is the value of the accumulation; R is the variable annuity's
assumed interest rate, as in Bodie and Pesando (1983); and T is the
number of periods over which the annuitant chooses to receive pay-
outs. Variable annuity payouts depend on the returns on the assets
that underlie the annuity. A variable annuity is defined by an initial
annuity payment A0, and an updating rule that relates the annuity
payout in future periods to the previous payout and the intervening
portfolio returns. If the return in each period is denoted byZt, then the
updating rule for the annuity payout A is:
A(1 -1-z. A+i ='
With a fixed number (T) of variable payouts, the arinuitant's tax in
period t is:
TAXI=(A-
This formula distributes the premium amount equally across all annu-
ity payouts.172 Brown and Poterba
Finally, the policyholder could choose a life contingent annuity,
which therefore has an unknown number of payments and uncertainty
about the payout size. For a life annuity, A0 is determined by solving:
A0 St
(1+R)t
where S is the probability that the individual will live to period t, and
T is chosen to represent the maximum number of periods over which
the annuitant might live.
The tax treatment of life-contingent payouts differs from that of cer-
tain payouts that are paid over a fixed time period. For life annuities,
the IRS specifies an inclusion ratio (2), which determines the share of
annuity payments in each period that must be included in the recipi-
ent's taxable income. The inclusion ratio is designed to measure the
fraction of each annuity payout that reflects the capital income on the
accumulating value of the annuity premium. The inclusion ratio is cal-
culated by finding the expected number of years over which the annu-
itant can expect to receive benefits. This period, T', is determined by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) using the Uniform Life Expectancy
Table and the individual annuitant's age at the time when payouts
begin. The inclusion ratio is:
2=1
P
Until T' years after the annuity payout begins, the tax payment on
each annuity payment is given by TAXI =. 2 A. After T' years, all
payouts from the annuity policy are considered taxable income. This
tax rule causes a discrete increase in the annuitant's tax burden, often
at an advanced age.
Payouts from variable annuities are taxed as ordinary income.
Investors who hold variable annuities that invest in corporate equities
or other assets that may generate substantial capital gains aretherefore
giving up the opportunity to receive capital gains tax treatment on the
value of their appreciating assets. The difference between the capital
gains tax rate and the ordinary income tax rate is therefore a critical de-
terminant of the tax advantage of investing in variable annuities.
Consider a simple example of an equity index fund that earns an 8
percent return each year, net of expenses, with 2 percent from divi-
dends and the remaining 6 percent from capital gains. Assume that
the tax regime is similar to the one that applied during our sample pe-
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nod, and that it assigned a notably higher tax rate to equity income
than the current U.S. income tax does. In particular, assume that the in-
vestor is in a 33 percent marginal tax bracket for ordinary income, and
that the statutory long-term capital gains tax rate is 20 percent. Further
assume that capital gains are taxed as they accrue. The annual return
on this fund is therefore 6.14 percent (6.14 = .67 * 2 + .80 * 6 percent).
Now imagine that the investor held the same investments in a vari-
able annuity so that all taxes are deferred until the assets are with-
drawn. The investor benefits from tax deferral but loses because the
withdrawals are taxed at ordinary income tax rates rather than capital
gains rates. Assume that all of the assets in the variable annuity ac-
count are withdrawn at once; this is the lump sum distribution option
described above. If the net-of-expense return on the variable annuity is
the same as that on the mutual fund, then the value of a $1 investment
in the variable annuity, after K years, is:
V(K) = eO08K -(eO08K- 1)(1 - + r
With r.33, this reduces to (.67) e8K + .33. For the variable annuity
to outperform the open-end mutual fund, we need (.67) . eOOSK + .33>
eO0614K, which depends on K. When K is low, the mutual fund results
in a larger terminal wealth than the variable annuity. When K = 5, for
example, the after-tax value of the taxable mutual fund is 1.36, while
the value of the variable annuity is 1.33. At an investment horizon (K)
of thirteen years, the advantage switches to the variable annuity. In-
deed, if the horizon is forty years, the value of the taxable equity index
fund is 11.66, while the after-tax value of the variable annuity is 16.77.
This simple analysis may overstate the advantage of a variable annu-
ity because it ignores the ability to use realized capital losses on tax-
able mutual funds to offset taxable gains, or up to $3,000 each year in
ordinary income.
Table 5.1 suggests that the expenses associated with a variable
annuity wifi typically exceed those on the equity mutual fund. We can
compute the greatest possible amount by which the expense ratio on
the variable annuity can exceed that on the mutual fund, such that the
after-tax terminal wealth from the variable annuity wifi exceed that
from the mutual fund. These calculations are in the spirit of earlier
studies, such as Milevsky and Panyagometh (2001), Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (2000), Reichenstein (2000), and Toolson (1991), which have
compared the after-tax investment returns available in variable annu-
ities and in mutual funds.174 Brown and Poterba
Table 5.2
Expense Differential (Variable Annuity Expenses - Mutual Fund Expenses) Such That
Investor Would Accumulate Equal Wealth, by Holding Period (in Basis Points per Year,
Assuming 8 Percent Rate of Return)
Source: Authors' calculations assuming 8% return (2% from dividends, 6% from capital
gains). Assumed tax rates for pre-2003 period are 20% for capital gains, 33% for divi-
dends and ordinary income. For post-2003, rates are 15% for capital gain and dividends,
and 33% for ordinary income.
Table 5.2 presents our calculations of the relative attractiveness of
mutual funds and variable annuities. Under pre-2003 tax rates and
assuming that the taxable mutual fund has a post-expense rate of re-
turn of 8 percent, at a horizon of twenty years, for example, expense
differentials of less than 37 basis points wifi result in a higher terminal
value with the variable annuity. Given an average expense differential
between mutual funds and variable annuities of 73 basis points, one
would have to hold the investment for thirty-one years in order for the
tax advantage of variable annuities to offset the expense differential.
The 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act reduced the
maximum tax rates on both dividends and capital gains to 15 percent.
In this case, the value of the maximum expense differential falls sub-
stantially and indeed becomes negative for holding periods as long as
twenty-nine years, meaning that for shorter holding periods, a taxable
account will yield higher account balances even with an identical cost
structure. Even with a horizon of forty years, under the new tax rates,
variable annuities provide a higher net of tax return only if the expense
differential is under 25 basis points.
2.3Insurance Features of Variable Annuities
Variable annuities offer a range of potential insurance features. In
particular, if the variable annuity owner dies before converting to a life
annuity, the insurance company typically provides a minimum guar-
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anteed death benefit. Milevsky and Posner (2001) explain that a typical
benefit stipulates that at least the original investment will be returned
to the estate or the beneficiary of the policy, regardless of the perfor-
mance of the underlying assets in the account. Thus, a variable annuity
buyer has a put option that has a nominal strike price equal to their
cumulated nominal contributions.
Milevsky and Posner (2001) suggest that the put option is the least
valuable option that variable annuities provide. Many providers offer
a guaranteed death benefit that set benefits at various high water
marks, meaning that they lock in some portion of past investment
returns. For example, a maximum anniversary value feature guaran-
tees the maximum value that the investment achieves on a specified
date, usually the contract anniversary date. The insurer guarantees to
pay out the higher of the value of (1) the purchase price, (2) the highest
value on any anniversary date, or (3) the value of the account at the
date of death. Alternatively, insurers may offer minimum growth guar-
antees for the assets held in the variable annuity by promising a death
benefit that is equal to the actual account balance or the value of the
premiums compounded at a specified rate of interest. This particular
death benefit is often offered as a rider at additional cost to the annuity
buyer.
Milevsky and Posner (2001) use option pricing techniques to com-
pute the actuarially fair value of the insurance component of these
guarantees. They find that "a simple return of premium death benefit
is worth between one to ten basis points, depending on purchase age.
In contrast to this number, the insurance industry is charging a median
Mortality and Expense Risk charge of 115 basis points, although the
numbers do vary widely for different companies and policies." In eval-
uating this claim, however, one should remember that the "one to ten
basis point" valuation is only of the simplest death benefit. In recent
years, the array of insurance benefits offered through variable annuity
products has become more diverse and complex, with features that are
often firm- or contract-specific. During 2001 and 2002, after a sharp de-
clime in equity markets, some of these insurance components proved
very expensive for insurance companies. Policy provisions that guar-
anteed variable annuity buyers the value of their portfolio at past pol-
icy anniversaries committed insurance firms to substantial payouts in
a declining equity market. For example, Treaster (2003) reports that
the Hartford Financial Services Group, which in 2000 paid out only176 Brown and Poterba
$5.4 million as a result of variable annuity guarantees, faced payouts of
$258 million during the bear market of 2002.
3.Summary Patterns of Variable Annuity Ownership
We explore the cross-sectional patterns of variable annuity owner-
ship using the 1998 and 2001 Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF).
The 1998 SCF is the first to distinguish household ownership of vari-
able annuity products from ownership of several other investment
products. Beginning in 1998, the SCF asks, "Do you (or anyone in your
family living here) receive income from or have assets in an annuity?"
Respondents are specifically told to exclude employment-related pen-
sions as well as any assets that have been recorded earlier in the sur-
vey. They are then asked to distinguish between annuities set up to
provide only income and those that "have an equity interest." We iden-
tify variable annuity owners as those who report having an equity in-
terest that is invested in financial assets, such as stocks, bonds, money
market accounts, and real estate. We exclude those who report that
their annuity is invested in life insurance/fixed contracts, tangible
assets other than real estate, intangible assets, and other assets since
these are unlikely to be standard variable annuities. We suspect that
our definition is conservative and that we have excluded some house-
holds who hold variable annuities.
Using our definitions of variable annuity ownership, there are 4.8
million variable annuity owners in the 1998 SCF. The total value of the
variable annuities reported in the 1998 survey is $255 billion. For the
same year, the American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) (1999) reports
that there were 14.6 million variable annuity policies in force, with
total asset reserves of $354 billion. National Association for Variable
Annuities (NAVA) (2005) reports $343.0 billion of variable annuity
assets in non-qualified accounts for 1999. There is no reason to think
that the number of households should match the number of policies
because households may have multiple policies even with the same in-
surer. However, we would ideally want the value of assets in the SCF
to match the asset reserves reported by life insurers. The SCF measure
is roughly three-quarters of the ACLI or NAVA number. We suspect
that this is because some variable annuity owners reported the assets
in these accounts elsewhere on the survey, perhaps as other financial
assets. We are not aware of any evidence suggesting that misreportingHousehold Ownership of Variable Annuities 177
rates vary by income, wealth, or age, or in any systematic fashion that
might affect our analysis.
3.1Demographic Patterns of Ownership
Table 5.3 presents summary information on the characteristics of
households that owned variable annuities in 1998 and 2001. The sec-
ond and third columns indicate the percentage of households with var-
ious characteristics that own variable annuities, while the fourth and
fifth colurrms show the percentage of all variable annuities that are
owned by households in each category. Columns two and three show
that just under 4 percent of households reported owning a variable
annuity in 1998. By 2001, this figure had increased to 4.65 percent.
The small fraction of households owning variable annuities, and the
high correlation between variables such as household income and net
worth, makes it difficult to obtain robust findings when we carry out
multivariate statistical analysis. Therefore, we restrict our analysis in
this paper to univariate analysis, which still provides valuable evi-
dence on the large and growing variable annuity market.
Table 5.3 indicates that variable annuity ownership is highly cor-
related with income and net worth. In the bottom half of the income
distribution, for example, just over 2 percent of the population own
variable annuities. In the top decile, the ownership rate is over 10
percent in 2001. Ownership is even more highly concentrated by net-
worth deciles, with 16 percent of the top net-worth decile owning vari-
able annuities. From 1998 to 2001, overall growth in ownership rates
appears to be largely concentrated at the top of the net-worth distribu-
tion, particularly in the top quintile.
Older households are more likely to own variable annuities. Less
than 2 percent of households under the age of 45 own variable annu-
ities. This rate rises to 5.7 percent in the pre-retirement ages of 45-64,
and nearly 9 percent for age 65+ households. Variable annuity owner-
ship is also steeply rising with education level, with 12.45 percent of
households with more than a college education reporting ownership
of an annuity, compared with less than 3 percent of those with a high
school education or less.
Variable annuity ownership is highly concentrated among high-
income and high-net-worth groups. In 2001, 38 percent of variable
annuities were held by households in the top dedile of the income dis-
tribution, and more than half were held by those in the two top deciles.178 Brown and Poterba
Table 5.3









1998 2001 1998 2001
All households 3.98% 4.65% 100.0% 100.0%
Households grouped by age
<35 1.02 1.74 3.5 4.5
35-44 2.38 2.06 15.2 6.5
45-64 4.50 5.68 51.5 39.3
65+ 8.13 8.88 29.9 49.7
Households grouped by education
<High school 1.16 3.41 3.9 3.5
High school 3.07 2.13 9.8 14.9
Some college 3.22 4.11 17.2 22.9
College 3.96 5.48 21.8 27.8
>College 12.28 12.45 47.4 30.9
Households grouped by income dedile
Lowest dedile 1.76 0.53 1.3 1.5
Dedile 2 1.86 2.22 2.2 3.5
Decile 3 0.97 1.06 1.7 2.5
Decile 4 3.48 3.67 5.8 1.6
Decile 5 3.45 3.28 5.8 3.7
Decile 6 2.82 6.01 4.7 14.4
Decile 7 3.43 5.77 3.7 12.7
Decile 8 7.03 6.71 18.0 8.4
Decile 9 5.61 7.52 8.1 14.9
Highest dedile 9.50 10.43 48.7 38.1
Households grouped by wealth decile
Lowest decile 0.45 0.00 0.0 0
Dedile 2 0.00 0.00 0.0 0
Dedile 3 0.43 0.36 0.0 0
Decile 4 0.00 1.06 0.0 0
Decile 5 2.23 1.75 0.5 0.2
Decile 6 2.18 3.11 0.9 1.3
Decile 7 5.92 3.14 4.9 0.7
Dedile 8 6.91 9.01 9.6 9.0
Decile 9 7.61 12.23 12.9 16.1










Source: Authors' tabulations using 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Since many retired households may have current income that does
not reflect their lifetime earnings position, ranking by current income
may provide an incomplete indicator of the concentration of variable
annuity holdings. The statistics on the net worth of variable annuity
holders may be more revealing. More than 70 percent of variable annu-
ities are held by households in the top 10 percent of the wealth distri-
bution, and only 15 percent are held by households who are not in the
top fifth of the wealth distribution.
3.2Marginal Tax Rates and Variable Annuity Ownership
Table 5.3 also stratifies households by their marginal federal income
tax rate and then tabulates the probability of owning a variable annu-
ity. Our tax rate variable is the marginal income tax rate on ordinary
investment income for each household in the 1998 and 2001 SCF. We
use an updated version of the algorithm developed by Poterba and
Samwick (2003), which estimates a "first dollar" marginal tax rate on
investment income. The algorithm was developed for use with all of
the available Surveys of Consumer Finances, including those from the
1980s. The set of variables that might be used to compute tax rates for
SCF households varies over time and has become more elaborate in re-
cent surveys. In particular, beginning in 1995, SCF respondents were
1998 2001 1998 2001
Households grouped by Marginal Federal Income Tax Rate (MTR)
MTR < .075 2.82 2.50 10.5 6.3
.075 <MTR < .215 2.05 3.50 8.9 23.7
.215 <MTR < .299 6.43 6.24 37.9 42.2
.299 <MTR < .350 9.33 11.00 14.3 12.7
.350 < MTR 9.71 8.27 28.4 15.1
Households grouped by level of risk tolerance
"Substantial" risk 6.40 5.36 4.77 3.42
Above average risk 5.02 6.31 20.46 29.05
Average risk 5.76 6.66 60.14 58.31
No risk 1.41 1.89 14.64 9.22180 Brown arid Poterba
asked if they itemized deductions on their income taxes. Recent sur-
veys also include information on adjusted gross income (AGI) that
was not recorded in early surveys. We are currently in the process of
updating the tax rate algorithm to incorporate this information. The
present analysis, however, is the same as that in Poterba and Samwick
(2003); it does not utilize the reported information on itemization sta-
tus or taxable income.
The tax rate is computed in two steps. First, we set interest and divi-
dend income to zero and find the household's federal income tax pay-
ment. Then we assume that the household receives interest income
equal to the maximum of $100, or 5 percent of its total financial assets,
and we recompute its tax liability. The marginal tax rate on investment
income is then defined as the difference in the tax liability divided by
the amount of investment income imputed to the household.
Our tax rate algorithm uses SCF data to impute as many items on
the 1040 tax form as possible. Filing status is determined by the house-
hold's marital status, with all married households assumed to file a
joint return. Personal exemptions are estimated based on marital status
and the number of dependents in the household under age 18. The SCF
reports information on many of the components of total income. Wages
and salaries, tax-exempt interest, alimony received, rents and royalties,
business income, and farm income are all defined similarly in the SCF
and for tax purposes. Unfortunately, many other income and deduc-
tion items, such as IRA distributions and refunds of state and local
taxes, are not reported in the SCF.
We make severalcalculations and imputationstoestimate
adjustments to total income, which in turn affect tax liabifity. Self-
employment tax applies to all business and farm income. IRA and
Keogh contributions can be imputed based on information in the sur-
vey, but we set these contributions to zero in computing ourmarginal
tax rates. The SCF also includes data on alimony paid, and this is an
adjustment to income. There is no data on other adjustments that are
allowed on form 1040, such as moving expenses, so we set these items
to zero. Subtracting the total adjustments from total income gives the
household's AGI. We also estimate whether each household wifi item-
ize deductions on Schedule A. The SCF reliably reports information on
interest payments and charitable contributions. Deductions for local
taxes are based on the reported value of real estate and personal prop-
erty subject to tax. Itemization is determined by comparing the sum of
these deductions to the standard deduction appropriate for the house-Household Ownership of Variable Annuities 181
hold's age and filing status. The lack of reported information on other
possible deductions, such as medical expenses, state and local income
taxes, casualty losses, and job expenses, is the biggest handicap in
using this algorithm to calculate marginal tax rates in the SCF.
The household's exemptions and deductions are then subjected to
the applicable income-based limits, and they are subtracted from AGI
to compute taxable income. Applying the appropriate tax rate schedule
to taxable income gives the household's tax liability. Total taxes equal
this liability measure, plus self-employment taxes and alternative mini-
mum taxes. We did not compute tax credits since the SCF does not
contain the information needed to evaluate most of them.
The rows in the fifth panel of table 5.3 present the results, with
households stratified by marginal tax rates. In both 1998 and 2001, the
probability of owning a variable annuity is higher for households in
high marginal tax brackets than for those in low tax brackets. In both
years, the lowest probabilities of ownership are for those with tax rates
of less than 21.5 percent. These households do not have ownership
rates exceeding 3.5 percent. Most of these households would either be
in the 15 percent income tax bracket or would be in a zero tax bracket
group. In 2001, households facing the highest income tax rates, those
above 35 percent, have a lower probability of owning variable annu-
ities (8.3 percent) than households with tax rates just below the top
range (11 percent). The pattern is different in 1998, when the highest
probability of owning a variable annuity is observed among house-
holds with the highest marginal tax rates.
The last two columns and last four rows of table 5.3 show the frac-
tion of variable annuities held by households in different tax rate cate-
gories. The 1998 data show that more than one-quarter of all variable
annuities are held by households with marginal tax rates of 35 percent
or greater. Only 10 percent of these assets are held by households who
are assigned very low marginal tax rates by our algorithm. The results
for 2001 suggest a shift in the concentration of variable annuity owner-
ship toward lower-income tax brackets. Only 15 percent of variable
annuities are held by those with marginal tax rates of 35 percent or
above, while there is an increase in the share of variable annuities that
are reported by households with tax rates between 7.5 and 21.5 per-
cent. The share of variable annuities held by those with very low mar-
ginal tax rates was lower in 2001 than in 1998.
One difficulty in evaluating the results on marginal tax rates and
variable annuity ownership patterns is that retired households may182 Brown and Poterba
have low marginal tax rates, even if their lifetime income placed them
in higher marginal tax brackets when they purchased their variable
annuity contract. To explore this issue, we stratified households by age
of the household head and then repeated our analysis of the ownership
probabilities by marginal tax rates. For the 45-64 age group in 2001,
the age group for which variable annuity ownership becomes substan-
tial, there is a monotonic relationship between marginal tax rate and
variable annuity ownership probability. For households with a mar-
ginal tax rate of 35 percent or greater, the ownership probabifity is 11.8
percent. For those in the 30-35 percent tax rate category, this probabil-
ity is 10.8 percent, while for those between the 21.5 and 30 percent
marginal tax rates, it is 7.6 percent. For older households, those headed
by someone aged 65 or older, the variable annuity ownership probabil-
ity peaks in the 30-35 percent marginal tax rate category, where the
ownership rate is 19.3 percent. For the elderly households in the high-
est marginal tax rate category, the ownership probability is 5.2 percent.
Similar declines are seen in the ownership probability at the highest
marginal tax rate category for those in the 35-44 and the under 35 age
groups.
3.3Risk Aversion and Variable Annuity Ownership
A household's risk aversion may affect its demand for the insurance
component of variable annuity products. We test for a positive associa-
tion between self-reported risk aversion and variable annuity holdings
using the responses to the following question in the SCF:
Which of the following statements on this page comes closest to the amount of
financial risk that you and your (spouse/partner) are willing to take when you
save or make investments?
Take substantial financial risks expecting to earn substantial returns.
Take above-average financial risks expecting to earn above-average returns.
Take average financial risks expecting to earn average returns.
Not willing to take any financial risk.
These measures have been used in Weisbenner's (2002) study of stock
ownership. We define four indicator variables corresponding to each
of the four responses above.
The results suggest that the probability of owning a variable an-
nuity is much lower for households that are not willing to take any
financial risk than for households that are willing to take average,
above-average, or substantial financial risk. The ownership probability
is roughly four percentage points higher for those in these three cate-Household Ownership of Variable Annuities 183
gories than for those in the not willing to take risk category. Most
households are in the average or the above-average risk tolerance cate-
gories. Those in the average risk group own 60 percent of variable
annuities. Those in the above-average risk category own 21 percent of
variable annuities in 1998, and 29 percent in 2001.
4.Ownership Patterns for Variable Annuities Compared with
Other Assets
While variable annuity ownership is a strongly increasing function of
income, net worth, age, and education, this is true for most financial
instruments. Table 5.4 presents information on the probabffities of
holding several financial asset classes other than variable annuities.
These asset classes include taxable bonds, corporate stock, mutual
funds, and tax-free assets such as tax-exempt bonds and mutual funds.
The sharply rising probability of asset ownership by income and net-
worth categories is evident for taxable bonds and tax-exempt bonds as
well as for variable annuities. For example, in 2001, the top income
decile's ownership of variable annuities was approximately twenty
times that of the bottom dedile, while the analogous statistic was
twenty-six for bonds, twenty-five for stocks, eighteen for mutual
funds, and twenty-two for tax-exempt assets. The wealth-ownership
profile is also steeply rising for variable annuities and other asset
classes.
The age-ownership proffle for variable annuities is much steeper
than that for stocks or mutual funds. There is a four-fold increase in
the ownership probability for variable annuities between ages 35-44
and age 65+, compared with an increase of less than 20 percent for
mutual funds. Table 5.4 shows clearly that the variable annuity owner-
ship probability is substantially lower than the analogous probabilities
for stocks or mutual funds but that it is comparable to the ownership
probabffity for both taxable and tax-exempt bonds.
Table 5.5 presents information from the 2001 SCF on the percentage
of various asset classes that are held by households at different points
in the age, wealth, income, education, and marginal tax rate distribu-
tion. The table shows that variable annuity ownership is less concen-
trated than the ownership of the other asset types. For example, 73
percent of variable annuities are held by households in the top decile
of the wealth distribution, compared with more than 96 percent of tax-
able bonds, 90 percent of corporate stock, and 90 percent of tax-exempt184 Brown and Poterba
Table 5.4














Total 4.65% 3.00% 21.75% 17.90% 6.75%
Households grouped by age
<35 1.74 0.40 17.57 11.50 2.66
35-44 2.06 2.04 21.76 17.64 5.17
45-64 5.68 4.12 24.50 20.90 8.96
65+ 8.88 5.00 21.84 20.26 9.30
Households grouped by education
<High school 3.41 0.28 6.37 3.41 1.40
High school 2.13 0.89 13.15 12.44 3.72
Some college 4.11 3.06 21.28 14.97 6.34
College 5.48 5.45 38.54 29.43 10.31
>College 12.45 8.44 41.84 41.31 17.61
Households grouped by income dediles
1 0.53 0.49 2.50 2.78 1.08
2 2.22 0.22 6.01 4.90 2.28
3 1.06 1.44 9.20 6.87 2.50
4 3.67 1.45 16.20 13.81 5.40
5 3.28 1.35 14.76 12.92 4.28
6 6.01 0.81 18.28 17.98 3.98
7 5.77 2.86 23.01 17.44 4.63
8 6.71 5.73 30.32 25.10 10.11
9 7.52 3.27 38.65 28.88 10.59
10 10.43 12.62 61.26 50.25 23.61
Households grouped by wealth dediles
1 0.0 0.0 6.88 2.08 1.74
2 0.0 0.0 0.48 0.0 0.0
3 0.36 0.0 4.00 0.34 0.20
4 1.06 0.24 4.86 4.48 2.48
5 1.75 0.76 11.86 11.42 2.23
6 3.11 0.74 21.89 12.91 3.71
7 3.14 1.54 21.68 17.73 5.81
8 9.01 2.22 31.47 28.74 6.11
9 12.23 5.83 47.87 44.24 15.82
10 15.93 18.72 66.79 57.27 29.53Household Ownership of Variable Annuities 185
Table 5.4
(continued)
Source: Authors' tabulations using 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
bonds. For mutual funds, the most broadly held of the financial asset
categories, the top tenth of the wealth distribution holds 79 percent.
Table 5.5 shows that older households hold a higher fraction of vari-
able annuities than of other financial assets. Households headed by
someone over the age of 65 hold nearly half of all variable annuities,
compared with roughly one-third of the other financial asset categories
that we consider. The concentration of stock, bond, and tax-exempt
bond ownership among the highest marginal income tax rate house-
holds is also greater than the analogous concentration for variable
annuities.
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 explore the cross-ownership patterns between
variable annuities, other tax-deferred savings vehicles, stocks, mutual
funds, and tax-free assets. If variable annuities are viewed primarily as
vehicles for tax-favored asset accumulation, but with higher expense
ratios than the investment vehicles that can be held in IRAs, Keogh
plans, and other tax-deferred accounts, then a high fraction of variable
annuity owners should also hold these accounts.
The results in table 5.6, which reports the probability that investors
who hold one asset also hold another, offer only limited support for
this prediction. Sixty-three percent of the households with variable
annuities also hold IRAs or Keoghs. While this is consistent with sub-
stantial use of tax-deferred saving vehicles by variable annuity inves-












Households grouped by federal marginal income tax rate
MTR < .075 2.50 1.38 7.20 6.44 2.61
.075 <MTR < .215 3.50 1.82 15.20 12.83 4.36
.215 <MTR < .299 6.24 3.60 31.51 24.41 9.26
.299 < MTR < .350 11.00 6.76 46.73 47.24 14.38
.350 < MTR 8.27 13.14 60.59 45.14 23.48
Households grouped by self-reported risk tolerance
Substantial risk 5.36 2.89 32.77 25.50 5.08
Above average risk 6.31 4.22 39.53 32.14 9.79
Average risk 6.66 4.28 28.00 23.21 9.22
No risk 1.89 1.22 6.27 5.35 3.19186 Brown and Poterba
Table 5.5
Share of Various Assets Held by Different Population Subgroups, 2001 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances












Households grouped by age
<35 4.5% 3.6% 6.3% 3.6% 4.3%
35-44 6.5 4.8 9.3 13.0 5.7
45-64 39.3 55.5 47.7 49.8 55.1
65+ 49.7 36.2 36.7 33.6 34.9
Households grouped by education
<High school 3.5 0.2 1.2 1.3 1.8
High school 14.9 3.2 5.4 12.9 6.7
Some college 22.9 10.9 13.4 12.3 11.7
College 27.8 35.6 37.7 34.2 32.5
>College 30.9 50.1 42.3 39.3 47.4
Households grouped by income deciles
1 0.1 0 1.3 0.2 0.4
2 3.5 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.3
3 2.5 0.7 1.1 1.4 0.3
4 1.6 0.3 1.7 2.8 1.4
5 3.7 0.2 1.4 3.0 2.6
6 14.4 2.0 3.2 6.1 1.6
7 12.7 3.1 5.4 5.0 4.8
8 8.4 5.4 5.1 7.7 6.1
9 14.9 3.6 8.4 12.5 6.3
10 38.1 84.4 73.5 58.9 76.2
1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0.1
5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1
6 1.3 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.3
7 0.7 0.3 0.7 2.0 1.3
8 9.0 0.6 2.1 4.1 1.4
9 16.1 2.2 6.4 13.7 6.9
10 72.7 96.7 90.2 79.4 90.0
(continued)Household Ownership of Variable Annuities 187
Table 5.5
(continued)
Source: Authors' tabulations using the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
Table 5.6
Cross-Asset Ownership Patterns, 2001
Notes: Tax free assets include tax-exempt bond and money market funds as well as mu-
nicipal bond funds. All entries are based on population-weighted tabulations from the
2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
higher than the share of mutual fund or corporate stock investors.
Moreover, only 42 percent of variable annuity investors hold corporate
stock, and 22 percent hold tax-free bonds, even though these are
the other tax-favored asset classes that one would expect to find in
the portfolios of investors who are trying to maximize tax-free asset
accumulation.
Table 5.7 presents information similar to that in table 5.6, but instead
of reporting the probability that investors in a given asset class hold












Households grouped by Federal Marginal Income Tax Rates (MTh)
MTR < .075 6.3 1.0 1.6 4.9 2.3
.075 <MTR < .215 23.7 12.4 11.2 16.7 17.2
.215 <MTR < .299 42.2 16.4 23.8 29.7 18.8
.299 <MTR < .350 12.7 15.0 16.2 16.6 13.5
.350 <MTR 15.1 55.3 47.3 32.0 48.1
Households grouped by self-reported risk tolerance
Substantial risk 3.42 4.26 8.90 4.73 3.60
Above average risk 29.05 34.96 37.88 36.71 28.32
Average risk 58.31 55.99 45.33 50.33 60.04











Population 0.05 0.32 0.22 0.18 0.07
Variable annuity 1.0 0.63 0.42 0.50 0.22
IRA/Keogh 0.09 1.0 0.42 0.37 0.13
Corporate stock 0.09 0.62 1.0 0.40 0.18
Mutual fund 0.13 0.65 0.48 1.0 0.25
Tax free assets 0.15 0.63 0.57 0.66 1.0188 Brown and Poterba
Table 5.7
Asset-Weighted Cross-Asset Ownership Patterns, 2001
Notes: Each entry shows the fraction of the asset indicated in the row that is held by
households that also hold the asset in the column. Tax free assets include tax-exempt
bond and money market funds as well as municipal bond funds. All entries are based on
population-weighted tabulations from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances.
are held by investors who also hold another asset.Thus, in the first
row, 73 percent of all variable annuities areheld by investors who also
hold assets in an IRA or a Keogh. Fifty-seven percent of variable annu-
ity assets are held by households with some holding of corporate stock.
The results are broadly similar to those in table 5.6 in that they do not
suggest large differences in the share of variable annuity investors and
investors in other asset categories who hold assets in tax-deferred
accounts.
The critical question that such cross-asset ownership probabffities
raise is whether households turn to variable annuities after they have
exhausted other opportunities for tax-deferred saving. The SCF does
not provide data on contributions to tax-deferred saving accounts, so
we cannot identify households who are constrainedby the contribu-
tion limits for these accounts. Without more detailed information on
the other options available to each household, it is difficult to test for a
hierarchy of investment choices.
5.Conclusions and Future Directions
This paper documents the rapid growth during the 1990s of the market
for variable annuities. The gross volume of annuity sales rose faster
than the net volume of sales because many variable annuity contracts
were terminated and the assets were transferred to newannuities. We
identify two factors, the opportunity for tax deferral and the insurance
features of variable annuities, that might contribute to the growth of
variable annuities. We then evaluate the importance of these factors











Variable annuity 1.0 0.73 0.57 0.55 0.26
IRA/Keogh 0.15 1.0 0.61 0.41 0.25
Corporate stock 0.12 0.76 1.0 0.54 0.42
Mutual fund 0.18 0.77 0.67 1.0 0.51
Tax free assets 0.10 0.84 0.74 0.63 1.0Household Ownership of Variable Annuities 189
nances, which included questions that identify variable annuity holders
in the United States.
We find that variable annuity ownership is strongly increasing with
income, wealth, age, and education. We find, however, that ownership
of variable annuities across the education, income, and net worth dis-
tribution is less concentrated than ownership of most other financial
assets. Compared to other financial assets, variable annuities are more
heavily concentrated at older ages. With regard to marginal tax rates,
we find that higher marginal tax rates are associated with a greater
probability of variable annuity ownership at low and moderate tax
rates but that this monotone progression breaks down for the tax-
payers in the highest tax brackets.
Our proxy variables for risk aversion suggest that households that
report a low tolerance for risk are much less likely to hold variable
annuities than are households with greater risk tolerance. This mayre-
flect greater willingness of such households to invest in the assets that
are held in variable annuities, rather than demand for the insurance
component of variable annuities.
The SCF and other household surveys do not collect detailed infor-
mation on the payout phase of variable annuities, in particular theuse
of lump-sum payouts and annuitized streams. We hope that this data
deficiency will be addressed in future surveys, and that we can then
determine how many households are choosing lump-sum payouts
rather than various annuity options.
Our analysis offers a useful starting point for the analysis of variable
annuity demand, but many issues are left unresolved. For example,as
our numerical examples ifiustrate, the 2003 federal income tax reform
substantially reduced the incentive for households to invest in variable
annuities relative to alternative investment products. A careful exami-
nation of how this tax change affects incentives and behaviormay
shed additional light on this issue. A second issue involves thesepa-
rate analysis of the group and the individual markets for variable
annuities. Group variable annuities are often purchased as part of
employer-based retirement planning, and consequently theymay not
reflect the particular portfolio demands of the taxable households that
own them. Jndividual purchases of variable annuities, however, are
more likely to be driven by the specific after-tax portfolio needs of the
purchaser. One useful enhancement of the household-level data on
annuity ownership would be distinguishing group and individual
annuity purchases. Another issue that requires future analysis is the190 Brown and Poterba
computation of effective load factors on variable annuities and the
comparison between these loads and those on other insuranceprod-
ucts. For example, Mitchell et al. (1999) find loads onfixed life annuity
products of around 15 percent, while Brown and Fiukelstein(2004)
find loads on long-term care insurance as high as 50 percent for men.
Computing the loads on variable annuities is more difficult than com-
puting the loads on some other insurance products because the return
to a variable annuity investor depends on theinvestor's behavior. If
the variable annuity is held for many years, and if the payouts are
withdrawn as annuity payments, the net after-tax and after-expense re-
turn may be substantially greater than if the variableannuity is trans-
ferred to another insurance carrier after just a few years.
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